Good enough is good enough?

Denbighshire County Council (Public Bridleway No. 1 in the Community of Llanbedr Dyffryn Clwyd) Public Path Diversion Order 2014.
Order Ref: R6830/W/2015/516064.
Inspector Emyr Jones.
This was an order to divert part of a bridleway from out of the garden of a house. The Inspector address what he calls a ‘clerical error’: in three places the order refers to and describes a ‘public footpath’ rather than a ‘public bridleway’. Mr Jones says, “I consider that the above matters are minor in nature and do not make the Order defective in matters of substance as described in paragraph 6 of Annex A to Circular 5/93, such that they are capable of resolution through modification.” That is an interesting view. Paragraph 6 says that the Secretary of State (this circular pre-dates the Welsh Government) can “normally disregard errors or defects of a minor nature provided they do not, in their view, prejudice the interests of any person, render the order misleading …” Isn’t describing a public bridleway as a public footpath, in an order, three times, in different sections, ‘misleading’?
In [4] the Inspector says, “The definitive route is also impassable because it is obstructed by a building, but there are other statutory means to deal with such situations.” Well, there may be, but that is not the issue, surely? What use or engagement do ‘other statutory means’ have when the Inspector is in the act of determination of the proposed diversion? Surely (as in England) the correct approach is to disregard such an unlawful obstruction as a ‘temporary circumstance’, and evaluate the proposed new route, against the old, as if the temporary circumstance were not there?
Also in [4], “Turning to the public perspective. The definitive route includes a steep section which makes it particularly difficult for equestrian use. The proposed route would only be around 8 metres longer, which would be a minimal change, and I am satisfied that confirmation of the Order would be both expedient and not substantially less convenient from a public perspective.” OK, but walkers are ‘the public’ on bridleways of equal status to equestrians. Where is the consideration of this fundamental test as regards walkers and the route as a whole? Walkers may well not find the ‘steep section’ any sort of difficulty. This has to be a matter of evidence and ‑ apparently ‑ there was none: the decision letter gives no reasons at all.
In [5] Mr Jones finds, “Furthermore, not going through the curtilage of Fron Goch would remove the feeling of invading the occupiers’ privacy which some users would feel, thereby enhancing those users enjoyment of the bridleway as a whole.” Well yes. That may be true for ‘some users’ (but is there any evidence of this, or is the Inspector engaging his own view instead?) but equally if it is true for some users it is untrue for some users, and the proportion of these different sectors has to be material?